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Motivation 
The economic disadvantage of landlocked countries is well established in the literature (Faye et al, 
2004). This paper investigates the economic impact of landlockedness on convergence. The 
econometric analysis is carried out for three income groups and the time before and after the global 
financial crisis (GFC) of 2007/9. The quality of institutions, investment rate, landlockedness, 
international trading costs and trade openness are used as conditional variables. The time period 
under investigation is 1996 to 2016. This paper contributes to the debate between geography (Sachs, 
2003) and institutions (Rodrik et al, 2004) as main obstacles for higher economic growth in 
landlocked countries. 
Literature review  
MacKellar et al (2000) find that landlocked countries have a lower economic growth rate. Their 
growth equation for 63 developing countries between 1980 and 1996 has a significant relation 
between economic growth and investment but international trading costs (measured by the cif/fob 
rate) are insignificant. A landlockedness dummy variable is significant. A low, but significant rate of 
beta-convergence is found for this selection of countries. 
Donaubauer et al (2018) find that the quantity and quality of infrastructure makes a difference for 
growth during 1992-2011 in 150 developed and emerging economies.  
Boulhol et al (2008) use an augmented Solow model for OECD countries to isolate the economic 
impact of geography. The authors focus on the distance to markets and transport costs. Both 
indicators come out significantly in their growth equations. 
Faye et al (2004) summarise their findings from a comprehensive study of developing landlocked 
countries. Besides the distance from the coast, it is also the degree of cooperation from transit 
countries concerning infrastructure supply, administrative practices and general commitment for 
peaceful relations which can have an impact on economic perspectives of landlocked countries. 
Rodrik et al (2004) estimate the impact of institutions, geography and trade on economic 
development for 79 developing and developed countries. Their result emphasises the role of 
institutions while geography and trade only contribute weakly to the explanation of income 
differences. Owen et al (2008) also arrive at the conclusion that geographical characteristics become 
insignificant once institutional quality, especially concerning the rule of law, is entering the equation. 
Sachs (2003) provides empirical evidence on the significance of Malaria incidence for economic 
development and insists that a complicated interaction of institutional, trade and geographical 
factors is at work for economic outcomes. 
Paudel (2014) confirms that landlocked countries face obstacles for economic development, but he 
finds a number of measures that can help to overcome a low growth environment. Especially 
important are transport infrastructure coordination with neighbouring countries, trade openness in 
general and good governance. 
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Arvis et al (2010) argue that the additional cost for international trade with landlocked countries is 
not only captured by transport infrastructure bottlenecks, but even more importantly shaped by 
logistics and transport services costs. Raballand et al (2008) find in a case study for Zambia that the 
market structure of transport industry and in particular the degree of competition in combination 
with low entry barriers can have a beneficial effect on economic activity in a landlocked country. 
A conditional convergence model 
The theoretical model used for the empirical estimates is a conditional convergence1 
equation: 
(1) yt = a + b*Y0 + c*ll + d*llY0 + e*irt + f*ciffob_ratet + g*iqualt+ h*tropent 
Variable list: 
yt  … Average growth of gross domestic product (GDP) per capita between periods  
   0 and t 
Y0 … Level of GDP per capita in period 0 
ll … Landlockedness Dummy (= 1 if country has no maritime coastline) 
llY0 … ll* Y0 (Level of GDP per capita in period 0 for Landlocked countries)  
ciffob_rate  … Relative –transport and insurance costs 
irt … Investment rate 
iqual … Institutional quality indicator 
tropen … Trade openness indicator 
Convergence is an outcome of “normal” economies with a sufficient degree of competition to 
eliminate monopoly profits and a favourable business environment which facilitates shifts of 
resources towards more productive activities. The main driver of unconditional convergence rests on 
the assumption that low-income countries have not yet exploited all profitable investment 
opportunities. In addition, conditional convergence acknowledges the heterogeneity of countries. 
The variables in equation (1) reflect either factors, which are directly linked to landlockedness 
(geographical location, costs of international trade), or could potentially help to overcome its 
negative effects on economic development (investment rate, trade openness, quality of institutions). 
The coefficient “b” reflects the speed of convergence depending on the initial level of GDP per capita. 
It is expected to be negative and range between -0.01 (low) and -0.02 (average).  
The coefficient of the landlockedness dummy “c” estimates the amount by which growth of GDP per 
capita is lower in landlocked countries on average.  
The coefficient “d” of the interaction term between the initial GDP per capita and landlockedness 
measures the degree by which the average level of convergence is reduced in landlocked countries. 
The coefficients “e”, “f”, “g” and “h” measure the impact of the investment rate (ir), the transport 
and insurance cost of international trade (ciffob_rate), the quality of institutions (iqual) and trade 
openness (tropen). 
This specification is used for three different levels of per capita income (high; high-middle; low-
middle and low) and for two time periods (before and after the economic crisis) in order to catch 





The following scatterplots and regression lines (Figures 1-5a and 5b) with all countries included 
indicate the expected signs for the bilateral relationships in equation (1) without significance tests, 
which are provided for the multiple regression estimates of equation (1), Tables 2-4.  
 
Figure 1: Growth of GDP per capita dependent on initial GDP per capita level 
 
Source: WB World Development Indicators 
The relation between average growth and the initial (1996) GDP per capita is negative and the core 
of every convergence model (Figure 1). 
Countries with a high CIF-FOB margin (high costs of international trade) achieve a lower rate of GDP 
per capita growth. 
Figure 2: Growth of GDP per capita dependent on the initial level of CIF-FOB margin 
 
Source: WB World Development Indicators and OECD International Transport and Insurance Costs 






















































































The relationship between the CIF-FOB margin and average growth of GDP per capita is negative, 
which is the expected sign. 
Figure 3: Growth of GDP per capita dependent on the initial investment rate 
 
Source: WB World Development Indicators and IMF World Economic Outlook 
A higher investment rate is expected to help achieving a higher GDP per capita growth rate, in line 
with a-priori expectations. 
Figure 4: Growth of GDP per capita dependent on institutional quality 
 
Source: WB World Development Indicators and World Economic Freedom Indicators 
 
Due to data availability the relation between institutional quality and GDP per capita growth is shown 

























































































Figure 5a: Growth of GDP per capita dependent on 1996 trade openness 
 
Source: WB World Development Indicators 
Trade openness is a predictor for future economic growth. Trade openness in 1996 is positively 
related to average growth between 1996 and 2006. 
Figure 5b: Growth of GDP per capita dependent on 2006 trade openness 
 
Source: WB World Development Indicators 
Ex-post trade openness and average growth are only weakly related. Higher average growth in the 
past does not appear to change trade openness in either direction. 
Empirical evidence 
Data 
Data on GDP per capita (constant 2010 USD) are from World Development Indicators.  
The investment rate is calculated as a ratio of total investment in current local currency and GDP in 



























































































gross fixed capital formation and changes in inventories and acquisitions less disposals of valuables 
for a unit or sector. Data are from IMF World Economic Outlook. 
The ciffob_rate is calculated according to the explanations in BOX 1 and is an indicator of 
international trading costs. 
Trade openness is measured as the sum of exports and imports of goods and services as a share of 
gross domestic product.  
Information about the institutional quality of legal institutions and a summary index is taken from 
World Economic Freedom Indicators. 
BOX 1: the OECD’s International Transport and Insurance  Costs of Merchandise Trade(ITIC) database 
The OECD’s International Transport and Insurance Costs (ITIC) database details the bilateral, product 
level international trade and insurance costs for more than 180 countries and partners, over 1,000 
individual products, for the period of 1995-2016 (last published in 2018).  It combines the most 
detailed cross-country sample of official national statistics on explicit CIF-FOB margins with estimates 
from an econometric gravity model, using a novel approach to pool product codes across Hamonised 
System (HS) vintages to maximise the number of observations for the regression. 
Data on imports valued CIF and FOB for the following countries and years were available in the ITIC 
database, by partner and detailed product: Luxembourg (2008-2011), Chile (2003-2013), Iceland 
(2001-2011, and 2013), the Czech Republic (2011 and 2013), Slovakia (2012-2013), Peru (1995-2015), 
the United States (2002-2016), New Zealand (2000-2016) and Australia (1995-2016). In addition, the 
OECD Maritime Transport Costs database, containing explicit CIF-FOB margins, was used for the 
following countries and years (see also Korinek, 2011): Argentina (1995-2007), Bolivia (1995-2000), 
Brazil (1997-2007), Colombia (1995-2007), Ecuador (2000-2007), Paraguay (1995), Uruguay (1995-
2007), the United States (1995-2001), Chile (1995-2002) and New Zealand (1995-1999). 
The methodology, as described in Miao and Fortanier (2017), argues that the traditional approach 
using implicit trade costs, i.e. the distance of the mirror flows, provides inferior estimates albeit 
wider countries coverage - the mirror flows present poorer matching quality than the trade and 
insurance margins that national statistical offices report.  
Stylized Facts – how different are landlocked countries? 
Table 1 provides summary information about the used data of developed and developing landlocked 
and not landlocked countries in 1996, 2006 and 2016. 
GDP per capita is highest in landlocked developed countries (e.g., Luxembourg, Austria and 
Switzerland) and lowest in landlocked developing countries (e.g., Ethiopia). The standard deviation 
increases significantly only for landlocked developing countries. In other words, between 1996 and 
2016 the country group of landlocked developing countries became more heterogenous. Economic 
growth was highest in landlocked developing countries for both subperiods 1996-2006 and 2006-
2016. Economic growth fell considerably from the first sub-period to the second, which includes the 
global financial crisis (GFC). The biggest decline is recorded for landlocked developed countries while 
landlocked developing countries achieve the smallest decline of economic growth. 
The investment rate is falling in developed countries and increasing in developing countries. This 
development was becoming more homogenous in developed countries while developing countries 
record an increase of heterogeneity between 2006 and 2016. 
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The CIF-FOB margin is falling in all country groups. It is the lowest in developed landlocked countries, 
which benefit from trade with high-income neighbours and the highest in developing landlocked 
countries, which suffer from inefficient border regimes and international transport infrastructure 
bottlenecks. Trade openness has increased most between 1996 and 2006 in all country groups but 
stagnated or even declined between 2006 and 2016 except for developed landlocked countries. 
Table 1: Drivers of growth and convergence 
  Not Landlocked  Landlocked 
 Developed countries Developing countries Developed countries Developing countries 
Variables Average  StdDev Average  StdDev Average  StdDev Average  StdDev 
Number of countries 44 69 6 23 
GDPPC_k 1996  26 224   15 450   2 717   2 555   34 386   28 585   1 164   1 192  
GDPPC_k 2006  32 702   17 699   3 492   2 923   45 145   37 304   1 768   1 980  
GDPPC_k 2016  35 066   17 961   4 205   3 307   48 261   37 659   2 398   2 653  
Growth rate 1996-2016  1.70   1.55   2.56   1.93   2.11   0.95   2.94   2.08  
Growth rate 1996-2006  2.59   1.89   2.80   2.40   3.13   1.10   3.14   3.05  
Growth rate 2006-2016  0.80   1.80   2.31   2.01   1.09   0.99   2.73   2.05  
IR rate 1996  25.42   13.70   21.99   10.50   28.17   6.17   23.40   11.93  
IR rate 2006  25.27   5.41   23.73   6.77   25.25   4.18   24.66   8.92  
IR rate 2016  23.45   6.16   24.52   10.58   22.20   2.94   25.89   11.95  
CIFRATE 1996  6.03   1.39   7.84   0.89   4.49   1.22   7.37   1.48  
CIFRATE 2006  5.70   1.43   7.52   0.94   4.37   1.10   7.36   1.15  
CIFRATE 2016  4.63   1.17   6.25   0.87   3.57   0.85   5.90   1.04  
Trade openness 1996  89.50   63.40   71.52   37.15   103.34   45.34   64.80   27.83  
Trade openness 2006  106.32   76.94   82.58   36.01   160.93   82.40   74.84   31.12  
Trade openness 2016  106.59   74.87   73.32   33.89   189.22   111.30   71.28   24.84  
Institutional quality legal 2006  7.07   1.26   4.57   1.07   7.46   1.19   4.45   1.19  
Institutional quality legal 2016  6.74   1.20   4.51   0.98   7.10   1.30   4.64   1.28  
Institutional quality summary index 2006  7.60   0.57   6.41   0.78   7.60   0.51   6.27   0.73  
Institutional quality summary index 2016  7.49   0.66   6.47   0.84   7.61   0.41   6.52   0.71  
Source: Authors’ calculation. Data are sourced from WB World Development Indicators, OECD ITIC 
Database, IMF World Economic Outlook, and World Economic Freedom Indicators.   
Institutional quality has not changed much between 1996 and 2016. It is - unsurprisingly - generally 
higher in developed than developing countries. Among developing countries, institutional quality was 
lower in landlocked countries at the beginning of the observation period (1996), but improved more 
over time. 
The interaction between geography (landlockedness) and the level of economic activity is not 
straightforward. Especially developed landlocked countries must have found ways to overcome a 
possibly negative impact of an unfavourable geographical location on economic activity. This points 
to the large heterogeneity of economic outcomes, as well as the various drivers of growth depending 
on the geographical characteristic of landlockedness. Therefore, results of convergence studies need 
to be interpreted with care (Phillips and Sul, 2009). 
Econometric estimates 
After some experimentation a specification including all potentially relevant drivers of growth and 
convergence named Base Model 1 (with the summary index for the quality of institutions) and Base 
Model 2 (with the index for the quality of legal institutions) turned out to generate the best fit. 
 
A common feature of the convergence equations estimated for the time between 1996 and 2016 
(Base Model 1 and 2) is that institutional quality of legal institutions is more important (significant) 
than overall institutional quality, measured by a summary index. The cost of international transport 
and insurance, measured by the ciffob_rate, is significant (1%) in the base model with the summary 
index of institutional quality (Base Model 1), but only at less than 10% if institutional quality is 
restricted to legal institutions (Base Model 2). Landlockedness is neither significant as a dummy 
variable nor in combination with the convergence term (initial GDP per capita level: llloggdppc_k). 
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The investment rate is positively related to average growth in both base models. Trade openness is 
not significantly related to average growth in either base model. The convergence term is significant 
for both base models at the 1% level. The convergence rate is higher in the base model with 
institutional quality of legal institutions. (Table 2: Landlockedness and the GFC, first column for the 
full observation period 1996-2016). 
Table 2: Landlockedness and the GFC (Institutional quality summary index) 
Parameter BASE MODEL 1 BASE MODEL 1 BC BASE MODEL 1 AC 
Dependent variable 1996-2016 1996-2006 2006-2016 
IR 0.0006 0.0006 0.0003 
t-statistics 3.1879 2.6968 1.2560 
Intercept 0.0877 0.0887 0.0546 
t-statistics 4.3435 3.5336 2.0642 
Summaryindex 0.0005 -0.0026 0.0064 
t-statistics 0.3686 -1.5002 2.5212 
Ciffob_rate -0.3714 -0.4607 -0.1343 
t-statistics -2.8591 -2.8535 -0.8395 
Landlocked -0.0067 0.0005 -0.0177 
t-statistics -0.4197 0.0229 -0.8278 
llloggdppc_k 0.0003 -0.0005 0.0017 
t-statistics 0.1768 -0.2169 0.6661 
loggdppc_k -0.0066 -0.0033 -0.0095 
t-statistics -4.2088 -1.7043 -4.9371 
trd_open (trade openness) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
t-statistics -0.3137 -0.3476 0.5583 
RMSE 0.0127 0.0158 0.0161 
Regressors in model 7 7 7 
Degrees of freedom 101 101 101 
R-squared 0.2467 0.1616 0.2696 
Adjusted r-squared 0.1945 0.1035 0.2190 
F statistic 4.7276 2.7821 5.3266 
p-value (F statistic) 0.0001 0.0109 0.00003 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
It seems that landlockedness as such does not lower growth prospects directly, but rather indirectly 
through the investment rate (IR), the quality of institutions (Summaryindex) and costs of 
international transport and insurance (Ciffob_rate).  
Separating the sample into the time period before (Table 2: Landlockedness and the GFC, 2nd  
column) and during and after the crisis (Table 2: 3rd column) reveals significant differences: The 
significance of the investment rate vanishes during and after the crisis in both base models. However, 
the quality of institutions measured by the summary index becomes significant.  
The quality of legal institutions remains significant before and during and after the crisis (Table 3). 
The CIF-FOB margin is significant before the crisis but not after in both base models. Landlockedness 
remains insignificant in both base models before and during and after the crisis. Also trade openness 
remains insignificant. In both base models the importance and significance of the convergence term 
increases during and after the crisis.2  
These results confirm the heterogeneity of economic outcomes also along the time dimension with 
the GFC marking an obvious break of convergence dynamics and characteristics. 
 
2 A similar result is reported for regional convergence in new EU member countries (Smirnykh and Wörgötter, 
2021). It seems that the GFC has hit high income countries/regions harder. 
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Table 3: Landlockedness and the GFC (Quality of legal institutions) 
Parameter BASE MODEL 2 BASE MODEL 2BC BASE MODEL 2 AC 
Dependent variable    
IR 0,0005 0,0005 0,0003 
t-statistics 2,8907 2,1759 1,0423 
Intercept 0,0824 0,0788 0,0815 
t-statistics 4,4266 3,2671 3,2862 
P2Legal 0,0049 0,0049 0,0041 
t-statistics 4,2116 3,2237 2,5834 
Ciffob_rate -0,2118 -0,2899 -0,0790 
t-statistics -1,6837 -1,7778 -0,4863 
Landlocked -0,0120 -0,0058 -0,0209 
t-statistics -0,8090 -0,2987 -0,9757 
llloggdppc_k 0,0008 0,0001 0,0019 
t-statistics 0,4470 0,0374 0,7669 
loggdppc_k -0,0097 -0,0080 -0,0105 
t-statistics -6,3914 -4,0551 -4,9648 
trd_open (trade 
openness) 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 
t-statistics -0,2476 -0,6649 1,0207 
RMSE 0,0118 0,0152 0,0161 
Regressors in model 7 7 7 
Degrees of freedom 101 101 101 
R-squared 0,3584 0,2229 0,2717 
Adjusted r-squared 0,3139 0,1690 0,2213 
F Value 8,0615 4,1392 5,3850 
Pr > F 9,1789E-08 0,0004 2,8855E-05 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
The estimated conditional convergence equations differ according to income level (Table 4: 
Landlockedness and Income Level).  
The influence of the investment rate is only significant for countries from the lowest income group. 
Low-income countries are often dependent on raw material extraction. The related economic 
activities are capital intensive and output is measured with comparably high precision. However, this 
type of economic activity is often associated with Dutch disease, making sustainable endogenous 
growth more difficult to achieve. Most other economic activity in low-income countries is informal, 
which is difficult to measure by definition.The quality of legal institutions has the expected positive 
sign but is insignificant for the middle-income group. This could be a sign of a “middle-income trap” 
phenomenon concerning institutional reforms. For low-income countries a basic level of institutional 
quality is crucial for developing a business environment, which relies on rule of law to protect 
property rights and the division of labour to boost productivity. This result confirms Rodrik et al 
(2004). 
International transport and insurance costs (ciffob_rate) and landlockedness are not significant for 
any of the income groups. This could mean that negative consequences of landlockedness as such or 
in form of higher trading costs can be compensated by other measures, like a higher institutional 
quality. 
The estimated convergence coefficient is high and very significant for the middle- and high-income 
groups, but insignificant for the low-income group. This means that not all  low-income countries in 
the group are  capable to develop endogenous catching up capacities. This result strengthens the 
need for well-designed policy packages – including institutional reforms - and a strong focus on 
commercial viability of investment projects.  
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Table 4: Landlockedness and Income Level (Institutional quality of legal institutions) 
  High income Upper-middle income Lower-middle and low income 
Parameter MODEL1 MODEL2 MODEL3 
IR 0,0000 0,0002 0,0005 
t-statistics 0,1003 0,5142 2,1475 
Intercept 0,1880 0,1934 0,0485 
t-statistics 8,5637 3,0708 0,8405 
P2Legal 0,0062 0,0044 0,0051 
t-statistics 5,0602 1,2977 2,9754 
ciffob_rate -0,1070 -0,2944 -0,2969 
t-statistics -1,1124 -0,7639 -0,7724 
landlocked -0,0513 -0,1498 0,0499 
t-statistics -1,2827 -0,3488 1,0135 
llloggdppc_k 0,0051 0,0171 -0,0082 
t-statistics 1,2763 0,3241 -1,0630 
loggdppc_k -0,0209 -0,0202 -0,0019 
t-statistics -9,5036 -4,1066 -0,3924 
trd_open 0,0000 -0,0001 -0,0003 
t-statistics 1,5303 -1,1640 -3,3585 
RMSE 0,0075 0,0129 0,0098 
Number of regressors  7 7 7 
Degrees of freedom 38 21 26 
R-squared 0,7370 0,5518 0,5352 
Adjusted r-squared 0,6885 0,4024 0,4101 
F Value 15,2127 3,6942 4,2781 
Pr > F 2,7386E-09 0,0093 0,0028 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
Conclusions  
Descriptive analysis shows that there is a considerable heterogeneity of growth outcomes for 
landlocked developing economies. The quality of institutions and trade openness are considerably 
higher in developed economies. The increase of trade openness between 1996 and 2006 was partly 
reversed or stagnated in the following time period between 2006 and 2016 with the exception of 
developed landlocked countries (Table 1). The investment rate declined between 1996 and 2016 in 
developed countries but increased in developing countries. 
Econometric estimates of convergence equations with observations from 109 countries before and 
during and after the crisis suggest that landlockedness as an economic disadvantage can be 
overcome by improvements of institutional quality, which remained important for the convergence 
speed during the whole observation period 1996-2016. The investment rate, however, loses 
significance for economic growth after the GFC. This might have to do with a growing importance of 
software relative to hardware. Low investment activity is seen as one element responsible for the 
low recovery from the GFC. 
An even greater break in the econometric estimate of equation (1) comes with a separation of the 
sample into three income groups: high income, upper-middle income and lower-middle income 
together with low-income countries. A dramatic result is the breakdown of convergence for the third 
income group. It seems that countries need to pass a certain income level before “normal” economic 
relations prevail. For this income group also trade openness has a negative and significant relation 
with GPD per capita growth. It could be that low-income countries cannot withstand the competition 
from more developed countries and are therefore not capable to benefit from the productivity 
increasing division of labour which comes along with more trade openness. The investment rate, 
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